

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LIFE MODES AND STATE FORMS

It is the thesis of this homepage that existing theories of state and culture are experiencing a potentially beneficial crisis at their foundations. From this crisis new modes of elaborating conceptual structures and new modes of viewing cultural history are taking form. This homepage presents a critique of existing modes of analysis, but it also introduces a reorientation of perspective by outlining how an epistemological break can bring with it entirely new scientific possibilities.

The homepage is intended to present ongoing work in the analysis of structural life-modes and state forms. Here we present an epistemological reformulation of the theories of state and cultural historical development, theories which will be further discussed in subsequent texts and materials. The goal of the homepage is to facilitate the forum in which researchers can present and refine the theoretical concepts and empirical ethnographies used to analyse the state as a cultural historical form and specific life-modes within states. This theoretical reformulation is not the result of any major new empirical “discovery”. Rather, it represents a continuing scientific process which seeks to show more productive ways of viewing cultural and social processes. A project of this kind can proceed only via negation and construction. It utilizes the experiences of several social and humanistic sciences, and grapples with a host of still unresolved theoretical problems.

Our theoretical effort to develop new ways of conceptualizing state forms and life-modes has its own prehistory: the theory's current form is a product of its historical development and current application. If effective use is to be made of prior experiences in order to facilitate “learning” and renew theory, we must understand the history of ethnological theory. Conversely, our understanding of the history of ethnological theory - i.e., how we view the decisive errors, ruptures, and new advances in ethnological theory - depends on the concepts and the horizons allowed by the theory's current form. Successful science constitutes an infinite, self-transcendent movement within this dialectic. The theory's current problematique equips us with the tools to grasp the history of that theory, and our way of grasping the history of theory informs our theoretical potential for reflexively conceptualizing and reformulating the existing theoretical problematique.

This dialectic is not only valid for the natural sciences, however. It is also relevant to the human sciences. Today it has become commonplace to emphasize that our society and life-modes are historical products. It is also generally recognized that our view of history is

conditioned by the way we perceive our present. Our concept of cultural history is itself a contemporary cultural historical product. The present inserts itself into the past, just as the past has a place in the present. We create history using present-day concepts and understandings of historical problems. Given these conditions, how are we to develop cultural historical theories? One task of this book will be to determine what is needed in order to “open up” our thinking (to use Bachelard's [1970] phrase) and to restructure our theoretical conceptual apparatus so that we can both build upon and transcend previous advances.

Ethnology is conditioned by a cultural-relational dialectic. It can be assumed here that our concepts and values are a product of cultural life-modes. Ethnological analysis thus concerns itself with studying all potential life-modes. On the other hand, the cultural relational dialectic also implies that our concepts determine the kinds of life-modes we can conceive. Ethnocentrism and *the continuing effort to transcend ethnocentrism* are therefore fundamental features of ethnology. Only by ongoing, reflexive work dealing with this ethnocentrism, so as to open up theoretical rethinking, can we sustain the kind of scientific process which enables us to conceptualize other life-modes and grasp the relations between different life-modes.

Finally, these considerations are themselves a part of ethnology's own cultural history. The metatheoretical modes of grasping the history of theory applied here are thus conditioned by the very same history of cultural theory. In terms of the theory of science, this book builds upon the tradition of classical structural dialectics - Aristotle, Leibniz, Hegel and Marx - and its most recent formulations centering around the philosopher Gaston Bachelard, the physicist Niels Bohr, the linguist Louis Hjelmslev, and the philosophers Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault.

Three Problems in Current Social Sciences and Humanities

Classical political science and history have traditionally had the history of state power as their object, while the social and cultural sciences have concerned themselves with societal developments within individual states or with social and cultural phenomena perceived as relatively autonomous from the state. The assumption that economic development is so relatively autonomous that it could be viewed as an independent variable is an example of the social science approach. In recent decades, however, inspired by Fernand Braudel, many historians have been preoccupied with studying the stubbornly persistent structures of everyday life, while the significance of politics as a rapid society-transforming factor has been accorded less significance. In the 1990s, interest among many historians and other social researchers began to swing back toward new forms of political history which again consider

the structures of everyday life as more dynamic, dependent and manipulable, while the political has again been accorded greater autonomous significance for the historical changes.

At the same time, anthropologists such as Eric Wolf and Jonathan Friedman, historians such as Charles Tilly and William McNeill, historical sociologists such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank, Barry K. Gills and Michael Mann and political economists such as David Wilkinson and Samir Amin have turned away from the study of individual societies to the study of “world-systems”, composed of several modes of production, or to “state systems” composed of many states. Interest has focused upon global economic flows, center-periphery relations, and power. While some research within international politics focuses on endogenous developments in individual societies, increasing numbers of sociologists and ethnologists are abandoning their previous way of looking at society and instead integrating perspectives from the classic problems and conceptions of geopolitics. Across various disciplines, diverse research environments are attempting to transcend their previous disciplinary perspectives and theoretical concepts.

Nevertheless, certain fundamental features of contemporary cultural and social theory remain surprisingly constant, unable, or unwilling to utilize the new modes of posing problems which could help us resolve some of the dilemmas of current cultural historical thinking. In taking up this task, this book will introduce the structural life-mode perspective and apply it to three interrelated problems.

The first problem is the above-mentioned conceptual centrism, which prevents people with a given form of praxis or culture from conceiving of each others' problematiques and conceptual worlds. This conceptual centrism may be manifested as “life-mode centrism” between various social groups in a society, as ethnocentrism between various nations, and as a disciplinary or theoretico-centrism of different theoretical orientations within research and epistemological theory.

The second problem lies in the implicit way in which we conceive of social units in the world. We assume that the world consists of states or separate societies, but we never allow ourselves to consider the kind of theoretical prerequisites on which such a world is based. The cultural scientists and geopolitically oriented macro-historians who emphasize interstate relations in their theories (McKinder (1904, 1943), Mahan (1902, 1965) or Thompson (1971, 1988, 2000, 2001), Rosenau (1971, 1988), Kennedy (1989)) never ask the fundamental question of *why the world is divided up into distinct political units* which border each other. What precise theoretical conceptual structures are necessary to exhaustively describe and explain a world of this kind? We take the existence of states (or societies) for granted and thereafter conceptualize about “relations” between them. This means that the emergence of world systems theory is predicated upon a theory of societies whose existence

we have already taken as given. Charles Tilly formulates this premise as follows: “States form *a system* to the extent that they interact with each other regularly, and to the degree that their interaction affects the behavior of each state” (1993:162). Following Tilly the system's essential features are a result of the definition or predicates of those elements - modes of production, states, civilizations, social formations, capitalists, and rulers, etc. - upon whose *fusion* it is based.

The third problem lies in the fact that as researchers we tend to discuss whether our concepts agree with our empirical observations, rather than dealing with how the continued use and revision of the utilized concepts can be structured so that we obtain a fertile, cumulative scientific theoretical development. We tend to emphasize “empirical experiences”, i.e., observation protocols, literary sources, documents, records, pictures, transcripts of interviews, excavations and other types of “data”. We tend to avoid thinking of *empeiria*, i.e., that kind of experience derived from developing and applying concepts as we explore the necessary relationships of a domain. The task of modern epistemology thereby becomes that of figuring out how research should be carried out. Instead of learning from experiences in the history of scientific praxis, that is, the experiences of elaborating and revising concepts and from elaborating what physicists call “empirical realizations” of those concepts (e.g. concrete theoretical models of actual societies) researchers are instead trained in using certain specific, epistemologically prescribed methods - hermeneutic as well as positivistic - to collect and process data.

In the following discussion I will outline how these three issues can be approached.

The Theory of Culture

Seen in terms of cultural analysis, the objective of developing a life-mode theory is to solve some of the central structural problems posed by cultural theory, problems which have occupied the international scholarly debate in the social sciences. The primary question focuses on how to explain cultural change and cultural differences in a society within the same theoretical framework. In social and cultural research, this problem is manifested by the repeated shifting back and forth between subjectivism and objectivism, determinism and voluntarism, functionalism and interactionism, structuralism and humanism or Marxism and Weberianism. At present, the structuration theory of Giddens and the praxis theory of Bourdieu represent two competing attempts to resolve the contradictions between these poles.

Life-mode analysis seeks to provide new answers to these structural questions by avoiding the tendency to base the culture concept on norms and values. Rather, the study of

cultural differences and contradictions takes its point of departure in a society containing distinct cultural life-modes, each of which creates its own mode of existence and universe of concepts. A life-mode, therefore, is not a variant of society's common norms and values. Rather, it is an independent and self-maintaining praxis which contains its own semantics and its own conceptual system.

Life-mode analysis evolved as an attempt to solve the problem that different cultural “values”, when brought together in interaction, failed to “homogenize” with each other. Despite intensive interaction between different groups, essential cultural differences tended to be maintained. The problem, then, is whether “cultural values” is a useful conceptual tool for explaining the persistence of cultural difference in situations of sustained interaction.

Life-mode analysis takes as its point of departure certain general features of conceptual systems, that every conceptual system's *problematique* or structure determines not only that which we can understand and imagine, but also what is excluded from being understood or imagined. The logic of a life-mode lies in the structural *problematique* by which subjects perceive “the environment” in the activities of praxis: when subjects disagree about what the world looks like, it is because they operate with different conceptual systems which blind them to each other's ways of seeing.

Seen from this perspective, everyday life contains a paradox: society consists of several forms of praxis, each with their own respective *problematiques*. At the same time, members of society are blind to these contrasts. Even though we may speak the same language, we use it to think and express fundamentally different conceptual worlds. The individual words are used with quite different cultural meanings. The differences reflect the differences in life-modes.

“Life-mode centrism” indicates the relationship between the contrasts and the blindness, a relation fundamental to the *problematique* of cultural theory. We talk about life-mode centrism because self-reproducing, ideologically-laden life-modes are unable to imagine and understand each others' *problematiques* and conceptual worlds. Cultural contrast and ethnocentric blindness require each other.

The solution offered by life-mode analysis to the paradox of the culture concept demands an unusual mode of thinking. This solution, although building upon the “mode of production-social formation” concepts of historical materialism, also transcends it. Life-mode analysis combines ethnological fieldwork with concepts from the theory of science to elaborate a new concept of class. From being a classificatory concept, “class” is transformed into what philosophers call an *intensional terminal concept* (Højrup 2002). By “intensional terminal” we mean a concept whose content derives from its role in a theory as end point of specific conceptual relations (in life-mode theory the relations of modes of productions). Life-

mode analysis inspires and challenges its own conceptual constructions by using detailed participant observation among various population groups to make the ideologies and everyday life of these groups more comprehensible.

This developmental work transforms group, sub-culture or class analysis into a dialectical life-mode analysis. Instead of classifying empirical data, we elaborate structures of theoretical relations and their conceptional end-points or “intensional terminals”, a term derived from the theory of science. Life-mode analysis has now made it possible to use the concept of “mode of production”, understood as a structure of social relations, to explain the various class-specific and ideology-bearing forms of praxis connected to the specific relations of a mode of production. The life-mode concepts are then elaborated as intensional terminals of the modes of production. For each mode of production, life-mode analysis thus develops distinct life-modes, each containing a conceptual world and praxis. Although these life-modes contrast with each other culturally, taken together they constitute each others' conditions of possibility in a self-reproducing social mode of existence.

By conceptualizing the life-modes of a mode of production as constituting each others' theoretical prerequisites, we can better explain the reciprocal life-mode centrism which occurs between different groups in a society. On the one hand, the social relations between life-modes entail contrasts in the realm of cultural praxis. On the other hand, the mutually exclusive conceptual worlds entails that one life-mode is in principle blind to the world of the other. The cultural contrasts make the life-modes blind to these same contrasts. Since each individual life-mode contains its own conceptual world, the population groups which manifest given life-modes in their way of life are able to conceive their own life, as well as that of others, only via the conceptual structures of their own life-mode. The forms of praxis of other life-modes are interpreted with the specific concepts of one's own life-mode. More precisely, there occurs a systematic misinterpretation of central features in the conceptual worlds of other life-modes. Thus the cultural centrism in the ideological relations between different life-modes arises. Within a given life-mode's conceptual world, it is impossible to fully grasp other life-modes.

This inability to understand (and this blindness toward the existence at all of) those life-modes whose basic everyday concepts are fundamentally different from one's own reappears in both the functionalist research tradition as well as that of sociological action theory. In functionalism, society's power of coherence or solidarity is conceived via the concept “collective consciousness” (Durkheim), “the pattern of shared rules, norms and beliefs” (Radcliffe-Brown), “the social system of status positions” (Linton), “systems of values” (Firth), “the pattern of organizational ideas” (Leach), “rules and resources” (Giddens), etc. Differences within society are conceived as sub-cultures of the common societal culture.

Within functionalism, subcultures are conceived as variants of a common culture and not as distinct, conceptually self-contained life-modes. Action theory tries to solve the “sub-culture” problem by emphasizing that different social groups attribute different values or norms to material goods, actions, and institutions. However, this assumption also fails to explain why distinct, self-reproducing, and ideologically-laden life-modes do not “homogenize” with each other when brought together in interaction.

The intent of this homepage is to present the theoretical rethinking which arose out of the critical analyses of modes of production, and to reformulate the conceptual groundwork for a new form of cultural theory.

The Theory of the State

In sociological terms, life-mode analysis can help us to understand what constitutes “a society”, an understanding which breaks with the classical view of the state. About fifteen years ago, a group of ethnologists and sociologists in Denmark and Germany began elaborating an entirely new mode of conceptualizing the state, inspired by Hegel's theory of “struggle for recognition” and by Clausewitz' theory of war.

The new state concept reflects the idea that each life-mode concept posits its own economic and political juridical preconditions in the society. Life-modes exist in a framework set by the state, while state policy becomes an arena for the struggle for recognition among various life-modes, a struggle known as “politics”. Central political direction can be viewed as the state's effort to increase, order, and control that part of its internal resource base relevant to its external relations, while a state's strength within the state system is based upon its ability to increase and mobilize its resource base for its own ends. In this sense, countries in a state system can be viewed politically: how do they force each other to promote similar or complementary new resource-giving life-modes in the individual societies?

The fundamental restructuring of various life-modes' political-juridical conditions is founded upon the state's continual reorganization of its internal structure, as a result of its effort to maintain its own recognition and sovereignty vis a vis other states. In order to defend this sovereignty as state subject, the state must recognize a number of life-modes within it, because the protection of these life-modes is a prerequisite for their ability to constitute the state's resource base. For the state, the plurality of distinct life-modes poses contradictory demands on society's political-juridical and economic structures.

The first condition which enables us to speak of a “state”, at all, therefore, is that we are dealing with a *state subject* which possesses sufficient defence capability to be able to act as a recognized member of a state system. In this sense, the concept of state is the theoretical

end point, or “terminal”, of the state system's theoretical relations; the state concept in turn derives its theoretical content from these relations. Without the struggle for recognition or defensive war, there is no mutual recognition of sovereignty or state system. Without sovereignty, there is no state. The capability of defence is thus the first theoretical *determinant* of the state concept. The state concept's other theoretical determinants, its predicates, presuppose this defence capability and from a theoretical point of view derive from it.

An emphasis on defence opens a perspective and a research agenda which radically transforms the conventional wisdom as to what constitutes state and society. From considering the state as an association of individuals, classes or institutions, based on the maintenance of internal functions in the individual society the dominant idea since Hobbes reintroduced functionalism in the social sciences the state should rather be seen as a sovereignty-maintaining and recognized member of a state system. Instead of viewing the state from below and from inside out, it must be viewed from outside and above. From an assumption of a state which rests upon a social organism, the state is conceived in terms of its defence capability vis a vis other states. From considering the state as an association of individuals or classes, the state must be considered as an element of the state system, and the state system a processual structure which divides up into individual states. The problem of state formation and state maintenance is not one of how groups come together and remain within a single political unit, but instead, how the struggle for recognition forges state systems which split the world into individual states and distinct state forms. “State theory”, then, becomes transformed from a theory of the fusion of social groups into a fission theory.

From this thesis, that state sovereignty is predicted upon recognition by other states, it follows that our task must be to describe the various potential principles which form the basis for mutual “relations of recognition” between states. Our preliminary investigation indicates that these strategic principles pose just as fundamentally different demands on society's internal organization as those distinct societal types with which we are familiar from cultural history. The question, therefore, is whether there exists a heretofore undiscovered connection between the societal forms studied by ethnology, i.e., “cultures”, and the possible forms of relations of recognition between independent, self-defensive units or “states”. If we can demonstrate a relationship between the fundamental relations between states and their basic life-modes, it would compel us to revise certain fundamental principles of state theory. The internal structure of a state would have to be explained primarily as an outcome of the specific means and strategies by which the state has historically maintained its sovereignty within the system of states, and not primarily as a result of internal factors. That is, fundamental concepts of “politics”, “economy” and “ideology” would have to be constituted by the functional demands of defending the state and not by class interests, our metabolism with

nature, and our use of language and ideas. Relations of recognition can help us explain a riddle which has been with us since Aristotle; namely, that societies invariably emerge as distinct units which interact with and distinguish themselves from each other.

Working with this new state theory leads us into the nooks and crannies of cultural history, because the study of self-defending units such as bands and tribes, and of city-states and the early empires, is of fundamental significance for understanding the state's basic and general features. The study of cultural history is both a prerequisite for and a means of ensuring the required level of generality of the theory's basic concepts. At a lower level of specification, we will show how these basic concepts constitute a useful point of departure for conceptualizing the various state forms used by cultural-historical research.

This new theory of the state is presented by developing an epistemological reformulation. Existing basic concepts are replaced by an entirely new conceptualization of the types of society which are the object of ethnology, and by new concepts of state forms, life-modes, politics, ideology and economics.

The Theory of Science

Seen in terms of the theory of science, and of cultural sciences specifically, developing theories of life-mode and of state form lead us on a fundamentally different path than that taken by positivism and hermeneutically oriented research. The latter two research traditions see their main task as ensuring that their single concepts correspond to a given empirical reality. While useful for explicating specific domains, this procedure tends to tie the theory to its specific conceptual creations. Inasmuch as the concepts suffer from “domain grounding”¹, i.e., are bound to a particular set of empirical data, it becomes more difficult to develop the given research's inventory of concepts. As a consequence, the results of the individual empirical studies tend to be atomized rather than integrated into a critical, intersecting, and reciprocal process of learning. In concrete terms, it means that state theory, cultural theory, and the theory of war operate in separate conceptual worlds, making them unable to learn from each other's results.

The research tasks of cultural theory, however, can also be approached in a quite different way if one asks the question, “What kind of theoretical development process do we want to promote?” In this case, our task would be to construct a mode of analysis and a conceptual structure which can facilitate the continuous, irreversible development of research itself.

Both the natural sciences and humanistic research (and more specifically, physics and linguistics) have been directly involved in elaborating the so-called “structural sciences”. Seen from the perspective of the theory of science, structural sciences address the question of what

kind of theoretical development process should be promoted. Within humanistic research, the work of the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965) is of central importance in organizing the conceptual apparatus of structural linguistics into a hierarchical structure. This hierarchy is a “root structure” in which the general (basic) concepts constitute the core of the theory, its point of departure, from which the formation of more specific concepts branches out.

The advantage of this structural form is that it creates a holistic and cumulative theoretical research process. It thus becomes possible to localize the shortcomings, self-contradictions, and domain grounding in the theory which the research uncovers when the concepts are specified and applied, and to discover how high up in the conceptual hierarchy it is necessary to proceed in order to be able to correct the concepts. Hereafter, it is again possible to elaborate the changes in all the underlying concepts entailed by the correction. Using such a framework can bring research into a more fruitful developmental process. The theory can “learn” from the experiences of theoretical and empirical research in applying its concepts. The testing of the theory's appropriateness and effectiveness can be conceptually grounded, a principle which Hjelmslev terms *empiriprincippet*, but which should rather be understood as “the principle of conceptual experience”. It is also possible to undertake well-grounded revisions of a theory's most general and fundamental concepts, i.e., to revise the conceptual complex which creates the theoretical point of departure for elaborating the more detailed and specific concepts when such revisions show themselves to be necessary.

In terms of a general theory of science, structural life-mode analysis is one such self-correcting theoretical praxis. It attempts to create an appropriate and cumulative scientific process within social and humanistic research. It tries to develop a conceptual structure which can use and integrate the experiences and results produced in the specialized branches of its empirical research, and which can also provide its empirical research with the critical feedback so that empirical researchers can put their own presumptions to the test and pose new, critical questions to the empirical material.

The second half of the introductory book *State, Culture, and Life-Modes*, Ashgate, (http://ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calcTitle=1&title_id=3877&edition_id=3969) demonstrates how this mode of analysis can enable us to carry out a well-grounded restructuring of even the most fundamental concepts, and how this can be applied in practice.

Towards an Integrative Theory of Cultural Historical Development Theory

How do states and life-modes develop? A fruitful way of approaching this question is to describe development in terms of a *fission theory*, i.e., as the concept of an ongoing, struggle

for recognition which theoretically “splits into” various distinct types of state systems and state forms. The states are “forged” in this struggle. They arise as theoretical terminals of the struggle for recognition. This thinking is explicitly developed in Chapter Three, which attempts to demonstrate that it is possible to develop a theory of cultural-historical development which is of the same order as the developmental theory of natural history, i.e., a theory of processual systems that divide into differentiated modes of existence.

The cultural-historical theory asserts that state forms and life-modes are social forms of subjectivity and self-consciousness. The life-mode and state form concepts contain a fundamental connection between (1) the cyclicity of the modes of existence, (2) their relations, and (3) their transformation. This connection constitutes the state system. The mutual recognition between state subjects presupposes a *struggle for recognition* which constitutes the state system's means of selection. Just as biological species are theoretically constituted by their interaction with each other, social units or states are theoretically constituted by their mutual recognition. Neither state forms nor life-modes have theoretical existence, either prior to or beyond their respective conceptual relations of the state systems. The “state system” is not a metaphysical entity which directs events, causes actions, or manifests itself in real history, as world-system theorists often treat their “systems” (Frank & Gills 1993). There exists no postulate in this thesis. Rather, the concept of state system can be elaborated as a theoretically self-determined conceptual complex, and we can experiment with this conceptual complex as a logical point of departure for developing the multiple, specific concepts of state form and life-mode required by cultural-historical analysis.

The state system is a theoretical structure of relations of recognition among self-defending and self-conscious subjects. To be a unit of this kind, the state must be able to organize itself internally as a social whole; it must be capable of mustering the defence capability to sustain its existence as an independent will with a domain of sovereignty in the system. As used here, the term “state” is not only limited to modern states. It is used more broadly to connote the self-defending, and therefore subjectivity-bearing, unit by which we imagine all human life to be organized. In this sense, relations of struggle between flocks of primates in nature evolve into relations of recognition between self-conscious, self-organizing, and in this sense tool-using human societies. It is in a milieu like this that the selection of Homo Habilis and Homo Sapiens became possible. In this sense the aristotelian theorem that *man is a political animal* makes better developed sense than we normally believe (Højrup 2002). The concept of *state* is in this sense synonymous with those subjectivity-bearing social units whose reciprocal praxis - in contrast to the actions of flocks of animals - makes possible a self-transcending process, i.e. cultural-historical development.

Natural history thus allows itself to be analysed in terms of *survival of the fittest*.

Cultural history should be analysed in terms of the theoretical concept of *survival of the superior defence*. In every specific state system, those life-modes which survive will be those whose state forms provide society with the superior defence capability vis a vis neighboring states, such that the neighbors will be forced to recognize its existence as a state subject with autonomous will and domain of sovereignty. In other words, cultures presuppose reciprocal relations of recognition, and the research problem is to discover the mechanisms of recognition and of mutual defensive superiority.

A state form (in a specific state system) survives only if it 1) has the necessary defence capability and defensive will to maintain its social formation as a recognized state subject and 2) can ensure the reproduction of those specific cultural life-modes which create the defence capability in the first place. From classical state theory and the theory of social systems and cultural development, this perspective brings us to a *fission theory*. The state system's *external environment* is constituted by the relations of recognition - ultimately resting on the state's defensive superiority in war - which divide the world into state subjects. The individual state form constitutes an *internal social environment* which divides itself into various mutually dependent life-modes. These life-modes are constitutive for the given state's *defence mode* and, hence, for its *vulnerability* in the state system. We must therefore elaborate the internal theoretical relations between state forms on the one hand and life-modes on the other.

The selection mechanism of the theory of state forms and life-modes can thus be deduced from its conceptual structure. It is constituted by a relationship between the mutual relations of recognition between states in the state system and the state subject's internal recognition or “interpellation” (to use Althusser's phrase) of specific types of dependent subjects belonging to their respective social formations. The concept of selection thus consists of a precarious relationship between the *independent subject's* state forms and the *dependent subject's* life-modes. Our task, then, is to specify the relationship between specific state forms and specific life-modes in distinct types of state systems.

i. I do not use the word “domain” in a geographical sense. Rather, it signifies the conceptual result of an overgeneralization from a specific case or part of the theoretical object, producing ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism, or life-mode centrism.